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Abstract
Botnet use is on the rise, with a growing number of botmasters now switching to the HTTP-based C&C infrastructure. This offers
them more stealth by allowing them to blend in with benign web traffic. Several works have been carried out aimed at characterising
or detecting HTTP-based bots, many of which use network communication features as identifiers of botnet behaviour. In this
paper, we present a survey of these approaches and the network features they use in order to highlight how botnet traffic is
currently differentiated from normal traffic. We classify papers by traffic types, and provide a breakdown of features by protocol.
In doing so, we hope to highlight the relationships between features at the application, transport and network layers.
c© 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
The digital age has brought many benefits to society,
with the Internet acting as an enabler for growth and de-
velopment across practically all sectors of business and in-
dustry. Unsurprisingly, it has also become an attractive
and fertile environment for criminal activity. Malware pro-
grams, which may take many forms, are now frequently
used for financial theft, identity theft, espionage, and dis-
ruption of services. A particularly troublesome type of
malware is a bot, an exploited system which acts as a re-
mote tool for an attacker to control and use the resources
of a target system. Typically, the attacker (called the bot-
master) will do the same for multiple systems and then use
them collectively, in what is known as a botnet, to launch
attack campaigns.
Botnet classification is based on the type of communica-
tion protocol used. The main classes currently defined by
the research community are P2P-based, IRC-based, and
HTTP-based. P2P-based botnets use a decentralised ar-
chitecture, in which each node can act as both a client and
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a server. In contrast, both IRC and HTTP-based botnets
operate with a centralised architecture, where bots are re-
quired to connect to a command and control (C&C) server
in order to upload data or receive commands. For this
study, we have chosen to focus on HTTP-based botnets.
The wide-spread use of web-based services has pushed the
adoption of HTTP as an advantageous communication
protocol thanks to the fact that it is usually permitted
by firewalls, and it allows bot traffic to blend in with vast
volumes of benign activity. The benefits of using HTTP
rather than IRC are demonstrated and discussed by Farina
et al. (2016) and Gu et al. (2008). Additionally, McAfee
(2015) listed at least 5 HTTP-based botnets as top spam-
mers in their 2014 Q4 Threat Report. This was also echoed
by Symantec (2014), where HTTP-based botnets made up
over half of their 2014 top 10 spamming botnets.
The difficulty of detecting botnet traffic (especially for
HTTP-based botnets) amongst web activity is a current
research challenge. Rostami et al. (2014) compared clean
network traces to those collected from HTTP-based bot-
nets. They focused on HTTP data in client-side PCAP
files to highlight differences in clean and malicious traffic at
the application layer. However, they do not consider how
this traffic may manifest at other layers, nor how it may
be measured. Both Haddadi & Zincir-Heywood (2014) and
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Beigi et al. (2014) study the effectiveness of flow-based fea-
tures in combination with machine learning techniques for
botnet detection. The former analyses the use of flow ex-
porters (used to extract and aggregate flows), whilst the
latter considers the use of different flow-based features as
inputs to machine learning algorithms. Whilst they pro-
vide interesting insights, these works consider neither fea-
tures from the application layer to help to characterise the
malware, nor the behaviours which may underpin them.
Meanwhile, Garcia et al. (2014) conduct a general survey
on network-based detection methods, including a categori-
sation of algorithms and in-depth analysis of key works.
However, they do not identify the specific features those
approaches use.
The aim of this work is to provide a study of the char-
acteristics of HTTP-based botnet traffic and the types of
features used to measure or detect them. Such features or
identifiers are the inputs to many detection mechanisms,
regardless of the methodology used. Therefore, it is im-
portant to have a clear view of both what these identifiers
may be as well as how they fit together. To achieve this, we
conduct a survey of recent network-based detection meth-
ods, with specific focus on the types of traffic they observe
and the parameters they define for the distinction of be-
nign and malicious network data. Identified features are
abstracted into sets, and classified by protocols and the as-
sociated layers of the OSI model. Our goal is to enable a
better understanding of the nature of HTTP-based botnet
traffic, including the underlying behaviours which cause it
and the implementation of different protocols. (Note that
the term “HTTP-based botnet” refers to those that com-
municate with C&Cs over HTTP, but they may use other
protocols for other activities).
The main contributions of this paper are as outlined
below:
• A survey of recent network-based detection ap-
proaches for HTTP-based botnets
• A survey of traffic-based features used to detect bot
traffic
• An abstraction of the main types of features in rela-
tion to protocols and OSI layers
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 will provide
a background on the observed behaviours of HTTP-based
botnets and the traffic which is generated as a result of
those behaviours. In Section 3, we will examine the works
that attempt to characterise those different types of traffic.
Section 4 is a look at sets of measurable features used by
existing works, broken down by protocol. In Section 5 we
discuss the implications of our findings and possibilities for
future work. Section 6 provides conclusions.
2. Behaviour of HTTP-Based Botnets
In order to interpret the traffic generated by bots, we
first need to understand the activities that they may be en-
gaging in. In this section, we consider sequences of events
in a typical botnet’s lifecycle, and split them into groups
based on the aims behind those events. We then consider
what kind of traffic may be observed for each of these
groups.
2.1. Lifecycle
Botnets inherently exhibit similar behaviours over the
course of their active lifespan. These behaviours can be ab-
stracted into a number of sequential stages to form a model
of the botnet lifecycle. The stages may be slightly different
depending on whether behaviours are viewed from the per-
spective of the botmaster or of the defenders. Rodriguez-
Gomez et al. (2013) consider the former approach, and
define the lifecycle as Conception, Recruitment, Interac-
tion, Marketing, Attack Execution and Attack Success.
Conception covers the initial design and development of
the malware, including the botmaster’s motivations. The
Recruitment stage is the infection process through which
new bot victims are acquired. Next, the Interaction stage
is where communication channels are established, includ-
ing those between the bots and C&C servers. Marketing
is (as the name suggests) the advertisement of the botnet
or its services. Attack Execution will then depend on the
chosen campaign, and the end of this stage will be marked
by Attack Success.
Meanwhile, the stages as defined by Silva et al. (2013)
are Initial Infection, Secondary Injection, Rally, Malicious
Activities, and Maintenance. Initial Infection is the stage
where the bot malware first comes into contact with a
vulnerable node, and roughly aligns with the previous
model’s Recruitment stage. Then, a Secondary Injection
is triggered, where the executed malware downloads
additional configuration files. Rally denotes the initial
connection attempts made by bots to C&Cs from which
they will receive further instructions. This aligns with
Interaction in the previous model. The commands of the
botmaster will dictate the botnet's behaviours during
Malicious Activities (similarly to Attack Execution and
Attack Success). Maintenance covers the process of
updating or patching the botnet.
The lifecycle conceptually encapsulates botnet be-
haviours in stages, based on the motivation behind those
behaviours. This means that the traffic which manifests
as a result can be similarly compartmentalised, as defined
in Figure 1. In this study, the stages from the two mod-
els which are most likely to generate traffic are combined
as Propagation, Rally, Interaction, and Attack. Propa-
gation encompasses the proliferation and infection of the
malware (covering the Recruitment, Initial Infection, and
Secondary Injection stages). Then, the establishment of
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Figure 1. Lifecycle model adapted from Rodriguez-Gomez et al. (2013) and Silva et al. (2013), with definitions of traffic types for each stage.
control channels is covered by the Rally stage. Interac-
tion denotes control traffic between bots and the C&Cs
(including the dissemination of commands, as well as up-
dates), followed by Attack to cover Malicious Activities
and related traffic.
2.2. Behaviours & Observed Traffic
As a bot progresses through the lifecycle, it will execute
different tasks. Traffic should be generated at each step,
with characteristics reflective of what the bot is trying to
accomplish. This section provides a close-up of possible
traffic that may be observed at each stage of the lifecycle.
2.2.1. Propagation Behaviours
A botnet accumulates resources through the infection of
vulnerable systems. HTTP-based bot binaries are spread
to victims through propagation vectors including drive-bys
(e.g. Asprox, observed by Borgaonkar (2010)), spam and
social engineering (e.g. KoobFace, reported by Thomas
& Nicol (2010)), and pay-per-download campaigns (e.g.
DirtJumper, reported by Andrade & Vlajic (2012)). An
executed bot binary will begin to make changes on the host
system to obfuscate itself. Some may trigger a secondary
injection, contacting an embedded target from which ad-
ditional configuration files are downloaded (Silva et al.,
2013). The specific dynamics of the infection process vary
between malwares, delivery vectors, and campaigns. These
complexities make it difficult to separate bot infections
from other types of malware. Therefore, propagation be-
haviours are considered outside of our scope for this work.
We believe that this is a larger topic which warrants a
separate study.
2.2.2. Rally Behaviours
Bots which have successfully infected a victim will try
to rally to the relevant C&C servers. This process is likely
to be repeated on multiple occasions in a bot’s lifetime be-
cause of rebooted hosts (Silva et al., 2013) or servers with
changing domains or IPs. In order to make the initial con-
nection, some bot binaries are hardcoded with a list of
domains, which they will attempt to resolve (e.g. Citadel,
studied by Rahimian et al. (2014)). Alternatively, a do-
main generation algorithm (DGA) may be implemented
(as seen in Zeus, Citadel, and ICE1X, reported by Sood
et al. (2014)). DGAs are given a seed value and auto-
matically produce sets of “pseudo-random” domain names.
Both the bots and the botmaster must use the same seed
for their results to match (Sood et al., 2014). This adds a
layer of obfuscation by providing a kind of camouflage for
the registered domains (of which there will be only a few).
DGAs also enable the use of another obfuscation technique
known as domain fluxing, where C&Cs frequently switch
their domain names (Sood et al., 2014). Alternatively,
botnets may use fast-fluxing, where the IP addresses of
servers are switched instead.
2.2.3. Interaction Behaviours
Once a successful connection with a C&C is established,
bots can share and receive data from the botmasters. In
some botnets, new members are required to register them-
selves with the C&Cs (e.g. DirtJumper bots include a 15-
digit identification number in their first HTTP request,
reported by Andrade & Vlajic (2012)). For command
dissemination, HTTP-based botnets utilise a pull-based
approach, where members must initiate their own connec-
tions and continuously poll the C&Cs for updates. Asprox
(Borgaonkar, 2010), DirtJumper (Andrade & Vlajic, 2012)
and Zeus (Binsalleeh et al., 2010) all display such polling
behaviour. The advantage in doing so is that perimeter
controls such as firewalls are circumvented. Most fire-
walls allow outgoing connections on HTTP ports 80 or 443
for standard web traffic. Data that bots receive from the
C&Cs may include configuration files, updates (for mainte-
nance purposes), or attack instructions (e.g. Asprox bots
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receive JavaScript files for drive-by-downloads, reported
by Borgaonkar (2010)). Bots may also send data back to
the server, including log information on running attacks
(Farina et al., 2016) or users’ personal details harvested
from the victim node.
2.2.4. Attack Behaviours
Bots will then engage in attacks depending on the nature
of the instructions that they receive. HTTP-based botnets
have been observed conducting a variety of attack cam-
paigns, including DDoS (e.g. BlackEnergy, reported by
Shiaeles et al. (2012)), web injects and man-in-the-browser
attacks (e.g. Zeus and Citadel (Sood et al., 2014)), SQL
injections (e.g. Asprox, studied by Borgaonkar (2010)),
and many others. The kinds of traffic which are generated
will naturally depend on the nature of the attack.
Table 1 provides a summary of some reported bot be-
haviours and the corresponding traffic which is generated
by them.
3. Characterisation & Identification of HTTP-
Based Botnet Traffic
The traffic generated by HTTP-based botnets is charac-
teristic of their underlying behaviours. Existing network-
based detection approaches are therefore built on this un-
derstanding in order to distinguish between benign and
malicious traffic. In this section, current detection ap-
proaches tailored for (or applicable to) HTTP-based bot-
nets are surveyed according to the types of traffic they aim
to identify.
3.1. Identification of Rally Traffic
Sharifnya & Abadi (2013) study rally behaviours related
to domain-fluxing botnets like Kraken and propose a rep-
utation system to identify the use of DGAs. Bots are ex-
pected to generate a number of domain names, each of
which will be queried until one can be resolved. The sys-
tem groups DNS queries by similarity, and then examines
them for domains which appear to be algorithmically gen-
erated. For a series of observed time windows, they extract
the hosts who a) query one of those domains and b) gener-
ate a high number of query failures. These two properties
are then combined to calculate the host’s negative reputa-
tion score. Hosts who appear in multiple time windows, or
behave as part of a group are considered more suspicious
and given higher scores.
Domain-fluxing is also the focus of Schiavoni et al.
(2014), who propose a system called Phoenix. They model
benign domains by their adherence to language rules (de-
scribed as being pronounceable). Malicious domains in
DNS traffic are identified using blacklists, and the queries
related to those domains are extracted. Both the domains
and their traffic are used in a semi-supervised learning
approach to identify the ones which do not match the be-
nign model. The expectation is that domains generated
by DGAs will be random and hence not made up of real
words. Phoenix then clusters malicious domains by their
IP-mappings. Each cluster is assumed to represent a single
algorithm, and is therefore used to generate a fingerprint of
that underlying DGA. The authors use the fingerprints for
detection, and report good results when testing on DNS
traffic from botnets such as Torpig and SpyEye (Schiavoni
et al., 2014). However, they note that this approach is inef-
fective against unregistered domains, and is also language
specific. Hence, domain names from another language may
cause false positives (Schiavoni et al., 2014).
3.2. Identification of Control Traffic
The periodic nature of communication between bots and
C&Cs is used heavily in the detection of interaction be-
haviours. Wang et al. (2010) claim that bots should be
automated and systematic, repeating sets of behaviours
with regular intervals. Based on this, they characterise
C&C traffic as a series of similar periodic HTTP messages
exchanged between bots and their servers. Clustering is
used to find statistically similar flows within TCP sessions,
excluding those with incomplete handshakes or empty pay-
loads. Clusters containing patterns of periodic behaviour
are then compressed into signatures to be used in future
detections. When testing on Kraken, Zeus, and Black-
Energy, the authors found that each malware family had
similar periodic patterns, suggesting that it may even be
possible to differentiate between traffic originating from
different botnets. The main drawback of this approach is
that botnets displaying random communication patterns
may be overlooked.
Soniya & Wilscy (2013) describe normal HTTP traffic
as bursty, meaning that a large number of connections
are made to the same destinations over a short period of
time. According to their research, botnet traffic (gener-
ated in a scheduled and automated manner) should be
more evenly distributed over time. They propose a detec-
tion scheme which identifies C&C communication by the
regularity of flow timings and sizes. Flows are extracted
from both normal and botnet traffic (collected from sam-
ples of BlackEnergy and Zeus), and aggregated by target
destination. Then the entropy of flow sizes and flow tim-
ings are calculated and used to train a neural network
classifier. Despite only using flow-level analysis the au-
thors report good detection results (97.4% detection rate,
with false positive rate of 2.5%). They suggest that the
false positives (caused mainly by software updates) can be
minimised using whitelisting.
Etemad & Vahdani (2012) take a similar approach for
centralised botnet detection. Like Wang et al. (2010), they
identify C&C traffic by the presence of periodic HTTP
messages. They highlight that no connections are main-
tained from one transaction to another, so bots contin-
4
D. Acarali et al / 00 (2016) 1–19 5
Table 1. Summary of some observed bot behaviours, and the traffic which is generated as a result.
Reported Behaviours Traffic Expected
Rally
Attempts to resolve C&C domains Bots will generate DNS queries, with failed queries due
to inactive C&Cs
Use of fluxing technology Bots will generate DNS queries for new C&Cs every time
fluxing occurs
Control
Authentication with the C&C Similar initial requests sent by bots from the same botnet
Command dissemination Specially-crafted packets containing specific command
codes and information
Provision of attack resources Similar responses/payloads sent to bots by C&Cs
Constant polling of C&C servers Repeated POST queries sent by bots on HTTP ports
Attack
Data exfiltration Similar outbound packets, with possible use of encryption
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) Sudden flux in outgoing (for bots) or incoming (for
servers) HTTP requests
uously make new connections in order to retrieve com-
mands. The system extracts HTTP traffic from network
data using a protocol analyser, and then identifies ex-
changes where hosts have made GET, POST, or HEAD
requests, and the servers have responded. A HTTP anal-
yser is then used to determine the level of periodic repeata-
bility in similar messages. Rather than examining packets
in their entirety, message similarity is determined by ob-
serving only the beginning of each packet (i.e. the first
sequence of bytes) for patterns or keywords. However, as
noted by the authors, this work also suffers from the fact
that random HTTP bot traffic will likely go undetected.
Another issue is the number of false positives caused by
traffic which is both benign and periodic. Eslahi et al.
(2013) propose a method to address this as well as the
detection of random patterns of behaviour. Based on the
typical characteristics of botnet activities, they define a
HAR (High Access Rate) and LAR (Low Access Rate) fil-
ter. In effect, these filters are designed to provide upper
and lower bounds of suspicious periodicity. When applied
to web traffic, the HAR filter removes HTTP connections
which are considered too frequent and therefore likely to
be generated by automated software updates. Meanwhile,
the LAR filter removes periodic HTTP connections which
happen too sporadically to be generated by bots (Eslahi
et al., 2013). The result is a distinction between benign
and malicious types of periodicity. The authors report
that this method was successful in reducing the amount
of data (removing up to 99.6% of the original test pack-
ets), but false positives were still caused by repetitive user
behaviours. They propose to overcome this by incorpo-
rating the use of User-Agent fields as a feature (Eslahi
et al., 2013), though this will be ineffective if botnets use
HTTPS.
Levels of periodicity are explored again by Eslahi et al.
(2015). In this work, the authors aim to better characterise
the types of periodic traffic most likely to be associated
with botnets. They extract HTTP traffic featuring GET
or POST requests and group by message similarity. Botnet
traffic is then identified using three metrics: periodic fac-
tor (PF) which captures repetition, range of absolute fre-
quencies (RF) which captures the frequency of events, and
time sequence factor (TF), which captures event distribu-
tion. According to the authors, events in botnet traffic
should repeat across multiple time windows, be generated
a uniform number of times, and be observed at equal time
intervals. This demonstrates the automated, systematic
nature of bots. The values from each metric are then com-
bined using decision trees to give traffic a final periodicity
classification. This work improves upon others by giving a
clearer definition of periodic botnet traffic. However, false
positives were reported once again, with the authors con-
cluding that periodicity should be complimented by other
measures for better results.
In an alternative approach, Lu & Brooks (2011) pro-
pose the use of network traffic analysis combined with hid-
den Markov models to differentiate the C&C behaviours
of Zeus from normal traffic. As before, the defining fea-
ture is considered to be periodicity, this time captured in
the form of inter-packet delays. These measurements are
used to generate a hidden Markov model to reveal patterns
in packet sequences. The authors expect members of the
same botnet to have similar behavioural patterns. There-
fore, detection is achieved by mapping data to the model to
test transition probabilities. This work demonstrates the
flexibility of using network traffic, elements of which can
be used as inputs for different detection methodologies or
systems. However, aside from only being tested with Zeus,
the obvious limitation is that random behaviours may once
again be unaccounted for.
Instead of focusing on observing low level flows or HTTP
packets, Venkatesh & Nadarajan (2012) propose the use
of the TCP protocol to characterise control information at
the transport layer. TCP sessions underpin the exchange
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of HTTP data at the application layer. Therefore, the
same patterns of repetition should be observable. Addi-
tionally, bots attempting to make connections to C&Cs
won’t always receive responses. Therefore, the authors
suggest that there should be a large number of half-open
connections and a larger number of outgoing TCP sessions.
They extract TCP information from both normal and bot-
net traffic, which is then used to train a neural network
classifier. This method is reported to achieve accurate re-
sults when applied to traffic samples for Zeus and SpyEye,
showing that TCP features provide a plausible alternative
to other approaches. The main drawback is that without
packet-level analysis, individual botnets cannot be charac-
terised.
Li et al. (2014) suggest that botnets implementing the
HTTP protocol often use poorly formed headers. There-
fore, deviations from protocol standards can be used for
detection. Network data is first clustered into groups of
similar flows. According to the authors, the packets ex-
changed at the start of C&C communications often contain
sensitive details (e.g. IPs, bot IDs, and process names).
Therefore, they reduce the volume of data by extracting
only the first request and response packets from HTTP
flows. The flows are analysed for periodicity, whilst packet
headers are examined for missing fields and malicious key-
words. The system combines the results of each check to
calculate a suspiciousness score for that flow. If scores ex-
ceed a threshold, the captured packets are used to generate
detection signatures. Whilst this is a good example of how
flow and packet-level inspection can be combined, such an
examination of packet headers may not be possible if data
is encrypted.
Grill & Rehak (2014) study HTTP header integrity as
well, specifically looking at User-Agent fields for their pro-
posed system. This field provides information on the ap-
plication that created the HTTP request, but its inclusion
is not enforced by the protocol. User-Agent strings are
also generated at run-time using details of the host OS
environment. The authors suggest that this is difficult
for botmasters to accurately replicate, so that User-Agent
will either be omitted completely or will use the same
values each time. For network data collected from web
proxy logs, they separate messages into 3 groups: those
with no User-Agent field (Empty), those which use strings
based on browser types (Specific), and those with strings
not based on browser types (Discrepant). They note that
spoofed strings will not be detectable with this method.
Each group is then analysed individually to find suspi-
cious hosts. For the Empty and Specific types, the system
looks for the least popular domains or the least frequent
strings and considers those anomalous. For the Discrepant
group, the host is checked for recent updates. If none are
found, this is also considered anomalous. According to the
authors, the most frequently seen type of fake User-Agent
field was Discrepant. The advantage of this method is that
it can be applied to proxy logs without needing flow-level
analysis. However, it will be ineffective against encrypted
traffic.
Meanwhile, Cai & Zou (2012) aim to use a combina-
tion of features in their proposed detection system, mak-
ing a number of observations about the difference between
normal and malicious traffic. They characterise bot re-
quests by the similarity of the target services, URIs, files,
and queries. HTTP traffic is clustered by request simi-
larity, with the least popular request strings being consid-
ered more suspicious. A list of suspect servers is extracted
from those clusters, and analysed for additional suspicious
traits, including the similarity of HTTP headers, the size
of responses from C&C servers, and the location of source
IPs. Like Li et al. (2014), the authors suggest that HTTP
headers generated by bots will be shorter in length due
to non-mandatory fields being omitted by the malware.
Also, C&C responses (consisting of configuration files or
commands) should be shorter than web pages delivered
by legitimate servers. Lastly, they report that bot source
IPs tend to concentrate within certain subnets due to local
propagation. The output of the system is a collection of
suspected hosts and servers. Despite using a combination
of features, they still report false positives caused by er-
ror messages and the use of the HTTP protocol for other
purposes. They suggest the use of whitelisting and addi-
tional features to overcome this. Overall, the system is
considered effective at finding unknown botnets.
3.3. Identification of Attack Traffic
Malware attacks cover a very large range of activities.
A central botnet attack function is data exfiltration, which
is studied by Al-Bataineh & White (2012). They observe
Zeus, whose members are known to use keylogging, screen
captures, and web injects to collect sensitive data on their
victims (Sood et al., 2014) which is then sent to the C&C
servers. Whilst this may appear similar to control traf-
fic, the focus here is not on the way bots acquire up-
dates or commands. Therefore, measures such as peri-
odicity and consistent packet sizes may not be applicable.
HTTP POST messages originating from hosts within the
observed network are extracted from web proxy logs, and
checked for encrypted payloads. Unlike Cai & Zou (2012),
Li et al. (2014), and Grill & Rehak (2014), the authors re-
port that in their observations botnet HTTP headers did
not appear anomalous. Instead, they consider encrypted
payloads in outbound HTTP POST messages to be suspi-
cious. Based on this, a decision tree classifier is used for
detection. Despite being modelled on Zeus, this approach
may also be applicable to others which operate similarly,
especially successors like Citadel. However, botnets which
do not use encryption may go undetected.
Meanwhile, Shiaeles et al. (2012) propose a method to
detect DDoS attacks, such as those implemented by Black-
Energy. They consider DDoS attacks to develop quickly in
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stages until they reach a peak level of disruption. There-
fore, the aim is to detect both the early stages and the
participating bots in order to mitigate damage. The ap-
proach is based on the finding that user-generated traffic
in a very short time frame (of up to a few minutes) fol-
lows a Poisson distribution. They extract TCP packets
(with HTTP payloads) and examine packet arrival times
for each time frame. Then, using fuzzy estimators, the dis-
tribution of incoming packets is compared to the historical
Poisson model to detect anomalies. After a DDoS attack
is identified, the same process is repeated for the packet
source IPs to find which hosts are generating the largest
amount of traffic. The authors report good performance
when tested on hPing and BlackEnergy. They note that
spoofed IPs or hosts behind perimeter defences may gener-
ate false positives, but prioritise the detection of DDoS in
small time frames, and suggest the use of integrated anti-
spoofing approaches and additional features for increased
accuracy.
Xiang et al. (2011) aim to detect low-rate DDoS, a
stealthier attack that uses a lower traffic rate and slower
pace to stay hidden. For their router-based approach, they
propose two new metrics called generalised entropy and in-
formation distance for finding uniform behaviour, focusing
on similar packet sizes and similar source IP ranges. Traf-
fic through the routers is sampled in 300 second intervals
and the probability distribution (of either packet sizes or
source IPs) is computed for each LAN. Generalised en-
tropy seeks to improve on Shannon’s entropy by adding
an adjustable parameter to influence whether higher or
lower probability events will have greater impact on the
final result. Meanwhile, information distance compares
the probability distributions across LANs, with the aim
of detecting the DDoS in the minimum number of hops.
If the results are above given thresholds, an attack is de-
tected, which then triggers an IP traceback algorithm to
uncover the bot sources behind the attack. The authors
tested on clean traffic from the MIT Lincoln Laboratory
Scenario and low-rate DDoS traffic from CAIDA, and re-
port fewer false positives with an earlier detection capabil-
ity compared to Shannon’s entropy and Kullback-Leibler’s
divergence. The advantage of this approach is its ability to
pick out attack traffic using only network layer features, as
well as an integrated method to identify malicious source
nodes. However, this scheme requires control of all routers
in the network which may not be possible in shared or
larger networks.
In another related work, Xiang et al. (2009) discuss a
deterministic IP traceback system called FDPM (Flexi-
ble Deterministic Packet Marking) for identifying DDoS
packets sources. The system is designed to be deployed at
the local router, and utilises certain bits in the IP header
(within the Type of Service, Fragment ID and Reserved
Flag fields) to ‘mark’ a stream of packets with the original
source IP address. Marks may be of variable lengths, mak-
ing the approach adaptable to varying network loads and
the use of different protocol combinations. If router load
increases above a threshold, the system switches to flow-
based marking, focusing on flows with close time proxim-
ity, that are going to the same destination, and consuming
a larger proportion of the available bandwidth. To reduce
the number of false positives, a low pass filter removes in-
stances of benign but significant “short-term fluctuations”
(Xiang et al., 2009). This work provides a positive ap-
proach to deal with IP spoofing. However, once again this
scheme cannot be implemented if the analyst does not have
control over all of the routers in the network.
3.4. Core Principles of Botnet Detection
The analysis of existing detection methods reveals some
common ideas about bot behaviour. These principles ap-
pear to underpin most traffic-based approaches, and can
be summarised as follows:
• Automation: Bots are automated programs de-
signed to conduct specific scheduled activities or to
respond to commands in particular ways. Therefore,
there should always be a discernible structure (and
possibly timing) to their behaviour and the traffic
they generate.
• Similarity: Whether large or small, a botnet is al-
ways made up of multiple bot nodes, and its success
depends on them working together. Assuming the
presence of a single controlling entity (i.e. the bot-
master), bots who are members of the same botnet
(or who are at least participating in the same cam-
paign) should behave similarly.
• Divergence: Normal user behaviour is highly ran-
dom and difficult to predict. This is a result of the
myriad of online services and resources available for
use. This should contrast highly with the system-
atic and consistent behaviours of bots. Whilst it is
possible to profile general user activities for anomaly
detection, we would still expect to see less uniformity
at a granular level than compared to an automated
bot.
Table 2 shows which of the 3 principles the surveyed
methods align with. Note that this is based on the explicit
approaches and the nature of the features used. Otherwise,
all botnet approaches implicitly touch upon all 3 principles
simply due to the nature of bot behaviour.
4. Features of HTTP-Based Botnet Traffic
Network-based botnet detection revolves around the use
of features which are extracted from traffic data. A feature
is roughly defined as an indicator or measurement that
captures an attribute of traffic. Comparison of instances
of the same feature taken from both benign and malicious
traffic should reveal differences related to the nature of the
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Table 2. Summary of surveyed papers and which of the 3 principles they based their approaches on.
Paper Automation Similarity Divergence
Sharifnya & Abadi (2013) Y Y Y
Schiavoni et al. (2014) Y Y Y
Wang et al. (2010) Y Y N
Soniya & Wilscy (2013) Y N Y
Etemad & Vahdani (2012) Y Y Y
Eslahi et al. (2013) Y Y Y
Eslahi et al. (2015) Y Y N
Lu & Brooks (2011) Y Y Y
Venkatesh & Nadarajan (2012) Y Y Y
Li et al. (2014) Y Y Y
Grill & Rehak (2014) N Y Y
Cai & Zou (2012) Y Y Y
Al-Bataineh & White (2012) N Y Y
Shiaeles et al. (2012) Y Y Y
Xiang et al. (2011) Y Y N
Xiang et al. (2009) Y Y N
activities which generate them. In this section, we survey
the features used in current detection approaches related
to HTTP-based botnets, specifically considering the IP,
TCP, HTTP and DNS protocols.
The IP protocol and its header information is gener-
ally useful for defining connection endpoints and finding
high-level statistical patterns. Though lacking in granu-
larity, this type of flow-based analysis can be automated
and used to filter out unnecessary traffic. Meanwhile, ob-
serving the implementation of the TCP protocol (which
commonly underpins HTTP communication) and related
features adds granularity to flow-based analysis by allow-
ing end-to-end connections to be split down into individual
sessions.
HTTP headers provide the most qualitative informa-
tion on botnet traffic, enabling not just detection but also
the characterisation of individual malware. However, addi-
tional processing may be necessary to extract HTTP mes-
sages from network data in the absence of web proxy logs.
Meanwhile, HTTPS (which adds an SSL/TLS encryption
layer to standard HTTP) may prevent this level of anal-
ysis altogether. Alongside HTTP, we also considered the
DNS protocol. DNS is classified as an application layer
protocol although it acts more like a network layer utility
(Odom, 2011a), bridging IP addresses with domain names.
Unlike the other protocols, the use of DNS during the rally
phase makes it possible to detect bots before they begin
exchanging data with the C&Cs.
4.1. Size and Frequency-Based Features
Size and volume are one simple way to measure traffic.
This may include the sizes of packets in terms of bytes, or
the sizes of flows in terms of bytes or packets, as well as
the volume of certain types of either packets or flows.
4.1.1. Network Layer/IP
Type : Similar Flow Sizes
Normal Traffic: Should be of varied sizes to reflect
random nature of online user activity.
Bot Traffic: Should be consistent, especially for the
same activities or for members of the same botnet.
Features: Entropy of packet counts for similar flows
(Soniya & Wilscy, 2013), generalised entropy of IP packet
sizes (Xiang et al., 2011), information distance of IP
packet sizes (Xiang et al., 2011)
Based on the principle of automation, bots are pro-
grammed to behave a certain way without direct individual
control. In terms of flow sizes, this results in a level of con-
sistency. As a hypothetical example, a bot configured to
send a certain type of message when triggered will likely
generate a flow of the same size for each instance of that
message. This will also apply to other bots from the same
botnet, as well as to responses from the C&Cs. Soniya &
Wilscy (2013) capture this as the entropy of packet counts
across a number of similar flows, where a lower level of un-
certainty denotes a higher probability of bots. Similarly,
Xiang et al. (2011) study packet size to detect DDoS at-
tacks. They sample traffic in 300 second intervals, and
then find the generalised entropy of packet sizes, where a
smaller result means that packet sizes are more uniform
and hence, more likely to be part of an attack. They also
calculate the information distance between the probabil-
ity distribution of packet sizes across consecutive LANs.
If the distance is greater than the threshold, an attack is
detected (Xiang et al., 2011).
Type : Flow Bandwidth Consumption
Normal Traffic: Apart from occasional random fluc-
tuations (possibly tied to a known benign event or
network error), there should generally be no sustained
and unexplained excessive consumption of bandwidth.
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Bot Traffic: During a DDoS attack, packet flooding will
result in flows with the same endpoints occupying a larger
portion of the bandwidth, making it difficult to run other
services.
Features: Bandwidth consumed by flows (Xiang et al.,
2009)
The size of flows may also be considered in terms of the
amount of bandwidth they use. Xiang et al. (2009) con-
sider the proportion of the available bandwidth consumed
by a flow when selecting it for source IP marking. For flows
(passing through the local router) which are targeting the
same destination (see Traffic Destination IP Addresses in
Section 4.3.1), the greater the bandwidth consumed the
higher the likelihood of those packets belonging to a DDoS
attack and therefore being marked.
4.1.2. Transport Layer/TCP
Type : Similar Session Sizes
Normal Traffic: Randomly generated TCP sessions,
containing packets of various sizes.
Bot Traffic: Comparable TCP sessions of similar length,
with similar sized packets
Features: Number of request bytes per flow (Wang et al.,
2010), number of response bytes per flow (Wang et al.,
2010), number of useful packets per flow (Wang et al.,
2010)
Similar flow sizes identified using IP-based features will
manifest at the transport layer as well. Bots generating
connections or responding automatically to triggers will
create TCP sessions for specific purposes. This behaviour
should be repeated over time, and by other members of
the same botnet. To measure this, Wang et al. (2010)
reassemble TCP sessions and filter out packets with empty
payloads or that are duplicated or retransmitted. Then
they count the number of packets in the flows, as well
as the number of bytes in request packets and response
packets.
Type : Proportion of TCP Packets
Normal Traffic: Random distribution and number of
TCP packets, both incoming and outgoing.
Bot Traffic: Large number of TCP packets, with more
of them part of outgoing connection attempts.
Features: Ratio of incoming to outgoing TCP packets
(per time window) (Venkatesh & Nadarajan, 2012), ratio
of TCP packets to overall packets (per time window)
(Venkatesh & Nadarajan, 2012)
HTTP-based botnets do not maintain connections to
the C&C servers (Venkatesh & Nadarajan, 2012). Instead,
the session is terminated, and then re-established for each
new transaction. Given that bots are automated and that
they behave similarly to one another, we can assume that
this process will be repeated many times by multiple bots,
which will result in a large number of TCP sessions. In
addition to this, pull-based bots must poll C&Cs regu-
larly, causing a large number of outgoing TCP connection
attempts. To detect this, Venkatesh & Nadarajan (2012)
find the ratio of TCP packets to the total number of pack-
ets per time interval, as well as the ratio of incoming to
outgoing TCP packets per time interval.
4.2. Temporal Features
Timing is obviously a key element in any type of traf-
fic analysis, both for sequencing events and understanding
event density. Temporal features may therefore be consid-
ered in terms of when an event took place, the period of
time between events, or the frequency of events for a given
interval.
4.2.1. Network Layer/IP
Type : Periodic Flows
Normal Traffic: Flows should be of varied lengths, with
random intervals.
Bot Traffic: Should show patterns of periodicity, and be
evenly distributed across time.
Features: Periodic requests flows (Li et al., 2014),
entropy of time gap between similar flows (Soniya &
Wilscy, 2013), inter-packet delays (Lu & Brooks, 2011)
As with flow sizes, flow timings should show consis-
tency, both across multiple traffic events and across bot
instances. As outlined by the similarity principle, com-
mands tend to be disseminated from a central entity, so
each bot receiving the same set of commands should work
to a similar schedule. For example, activities such as C&C
polling take place periodically, with the length of that pe-
riod defined by the botmaster (Binsalleeh et al., 2010). To
capture this, Li et al. (2014) look for patterns of periodicity
in clustered requests within a single time window. Soniya
& Wilscy (2013) measure the entropy of the time inter-
vals between similar flows, considering a higher entropy
score to indicate random, bursty user behaviours. Scores
that fall below a threshold are considered malicious. Lu
& Brooks (2011) capture the delays between successive
packets (specifically related to higher level HTTP POST
requests and responses) in Zeus bot traffic to generate a
hidden Markov model of botnet traffic patterns.
4.2.2. Transport Layer/TCP
Type : Periodic TCP Sessions
Normal Traffic: Randomly generated TCP sessions,
with no fixed timing.
Bot Traffic: Similar TCP sessions initiated repeatedly.
Features: Periodicity of similar TCP connections (Wang
et al., 2010), TCP packet arrival times (Shiaeles et al.,
2012)
As with traffic at the network and application layer,
periodicity should also be observed at the transport layer.
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Repeated TCP connections initiated by the bots are the
necessary foundation for HTTP-based polling activities.
For clusters of similar TCP sessions, Wang et al. (2010)
look for the presence of those sessions over a periodic point
sequence. This results in a binary vector, denoting if and
how often sessions from a given cluster were observed. The
greater the level of periodicity, the more suspicious that
traffic is considered. Meanwhile, Shiaeles et al. (2012) use
the arrival time of TCP packets (over short time intervals)
to identify developing DDoS attacks. Human-generated
TCP packets are expected to fit a Poisson model. Using
a fuzzy estimator, they model the standard mean arrival
time, with values falling below this mean classed as DDoS
events.
4.2.3. Application Layer/HTTP
Type : Periodic HTTP Requests
Normal Traffic: Various types of HTTP request,
generated with random intervals.
Bot Traffic: Repetitive HTTP requests generated at
regular intervals.
Features: Degree of periodic repeatability (Etemad
& Vahdani, 2012), periodic factor (Eslahi et al., 2015),
HTTP messages range of absolute frequencies (Eslahi
et al., 2015), HTTP messages time sequence (Eslahi et al.,
2015), HTTP request density (Cai & Zou, 2012), HTTP
request periodicity (Eslahi et al., 2013)
Bots communicating with C&Cs over HTTP need to poll
them continuously to receive updates. To achieve this,
they will repeatedly generate similar HTTP requests to
the server at regular intervals. The actual period length
will be configured by the botmaster, and may be different
across different instances of the same malware. Etemad
& Vahdani (2012) measure this using the degree of peri-
odic repeatability (and repeatability standard deviation),
where a low value means that communication takes place
at regular intervals and is therefore suspicious. Eslahi et al.
(2013) split their observation window into equal time inter-
vals and find the distribution of group events across those
intervals. Events related to bots are expected to appear in
all intervals. In a separate work, Eslahi et al. (2015) actu-
ally define 3 features. Periodic factor measures how often
a group of similar HTTP messages appear over a series of
time windows. The range of absolute frequencies is used to
measure how many times that group appears in each win-
dow. Lastly, the time sequence factor measures the time
intervals between groups of messages. Meanwhile, Cai &
Zou (2012) measure periodicity as the number of requests
between a client and a server in a time period, defined as
the request density. Bot channels are expected to have a
high density, as the same types of traffic are repeatedly
generated.
If the botnet utilises HTTPS rather than HTTP, than
periodicity of web traffic would have to be measured at
the lower levels, using destination ports to identify traffic
instances, and IP addresses to identify the endpoints. This
is because HTTPS encrypts headers as well as payloads,
making it difficult to identify what types of request are
being made.
4.2.4. Application Layer/DNS
Type : Group Activity
Normal Traffic: Various queries for different domains,
with large distribution of source hosts.
Bot Traffic: Suspicious DNS queries for the same
domains, coming from the same group of hosts.
Features: Suspicious group activity across time (Shar-
ifnya & Abadi, 2013), participant similarity (Sharifnya &
Abadi, 2013)
Based on the similarity principle, we expect members
of the same botnet to generate comparable DNS traffic
with similar timing. In other words, a large number of
similar queries will be issued by the same set of hosts.
Sharifnya & Abadi (2013) define a group DNS activity as
one where multiple hosts query domains using the same
TLD/SLDs or which map to the same IPs. A group activ-
ity is considered suspicious if those domains are identified
as DGA-generated (see Suspicious Domain Names). Sus-
picious group activity events are then mapped across a
series of time periods. As with suspicious failures, if a
host is found to have taken part in suspicious group ac-
tivities over multiple periods, this contributes to a higher
negative reputation score. Additionally, for a given host,
Jaccard index is used to measure the similarity of its par-
ticipants in those group activities. Bots are expected to
have a lower diversity of participants as the same nodes in
the same botnet work in unison.
4.3. Content-Based Features
Where available, the contents of messages at the differ-
ent layers provide details of the traffic which help to flesh
out the underlying activities. This may include various
header fields as well as the actual payloads.
4.3.1. Network Layer/IP
Type : Traffic Source IP Addresses
Normal Traffic: Source IPs belonging to users should
be randomly distributed across address space.
Bot Traffic: Source IPs belonging to bots should be
concentrated within certain ranges, and may generate
large amounts of traffic in response to certain events (e.g.
command dissemination).
Features: Source IP location (Cai & Zou, 2012), DDoS
participant host IPs (Shiaeles et al., 2012), generalised
entropy of source IP addresses (Xiang et al., 2011), infor-
mation distance of source IP addresses (Xiang et al., 2011)
Bots which manage to infiltrate a vulnerable network
are likely to propagate more quickly to local hosts than
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to remote ones. Based on the assumption that members
of the same botnet will behave similarly, in certain cases
this may result in a number of comparable connections
being made from similar address ranges to the same C&C
servers. For example, if the botmaster issues a general
update command, multiple bot hosts may attempt to
contact a server and download a similar binary file. Cai
& Zou (2012) capture this by observing the source IPs in
flows targeting suspicious servers, and sorting them into
/24 subnets. To deal with instances where legitimate users
make repeated connections to the same websites, they
combine this with their measure of periodicity to capture
request density (see Periodic HTTP Requests in Section
4.2.3). Similarly, Shiaeles et al. (2012) aim to identify the
hosts participating in DDoS attacks by calculating the
density of traffic coming from each unique IP address in
suspicious TCP streams. This is defined as the number
of packets generated by that host within the time period.
They then find the average inter-packet arrival time and
compare to a fuzzy estimator value (see Periodic TCP
Sessions in Section 4.2.2). Xiang et al. (2011) utilise the
distribution of source IPs by sampling traffic in intervals
of 300 seconds and finding the generalised entropy, consid-
ering a smaller result to be more suspicious. They also use
information distance to compute the difference between
the probability distributions of source IPs between two
adjacent LANs, and detect an attack when the result is
above a threshold.
Type : Traffic Destination IP Addresses
Normal Traffic: Destination IPs in benign traffic should
be randomly distributed to reflect the variety of services
accessed by users.
Bot Traffic: DDoS attacks, such as those launched by
bots, should target the same specific destination IPs.
Features: Flows with the same destination IP (Xiang
et al., 2009)
The previous set of features focused on attack sources
via source IP addresses. However, in the case of DDoS-
style attacks, we may want to consider attack targets as
well. In the flow-based marking portion of their work, Xi-
ang et al. (2009) aim to identify DDoS flows by observing
destination IP addresses. Specifically, they count the num-
ber of packets going to the same destination IP, and use
this to derive a marking probability. This is combined with
a measure of the bandwidth consumed (see Flow Band-
width Consumption in Section 4.1.1) so that the packets
marked as DDoS are those which add the heaviest load to
the network and who are targeting the same destination
nodes.
4.3.2. Transport Layer/TCP
Type : Broken Handshakes
Normal Traffic: Standard use of the TCP protocol,
with reasonable levels of error.
Bot Traffic: Large number of failed outgoing TCP
handshakes.
Features: Ratio of one-way TCP connections (per time
window) (Venkatesh & Nadarajan, 2012)
Bots initiating TCP handshakes with C&C servers may
not receive a response if the server is oﬄine, migrated, or
using fluxing technology. If there are multiple members
of the same botnet in the observed network, these failed
connections may happen within the same interval of time.
This will result in a larger-than-usual number of failed
or half-open connections. Venkatesh & Nadarajan (2012)
measure this as the ratio of one-way TCP connections to
the total number of TCP packets per time window.
Type : Flags
Normal Traffic: Standard use of the TCP protocol,
with random number of each type of flag.
Bot Traffic: Large (and consistent) number of TCP
packets with SYN flag, as well as PSH and FIN.
Features: Number of SYN flags (per time window)
(Venkatesh & Nadarajan, 2012), number of FIN flags (per
time window) (Venkatesh & Nadarajan, 2012), no of PSH
flags (per time window) (Venkatesh & Nadarajan, 2012)
A bot which is persistently attempting to initiate TCP
connections will naturally generate a large number of SYN
flags. Assuming that they are members of the same bot-
net, this behaviour will be observed across a number of
bots if the target C&C is oﬄine. We also know that there
will be multiple instances of bot-to-C&C sessions, and that
each one will be torn down once transactions are complete.
Therefore, bot traffic should generate many PSH and FIN
flags as well. Venkatesh & Nadarajan (2012) count the
number of SYN, FIN, and PSH flags in a single time inter-
val, where a large but consistent number of each flag over
multiple time intervals is considered suspicious.
4.3.3. Application Layer/HTTP
Type : Similar HTTP Requests
Normal Traffic: Randomly-timed, diverse range of
requests for various services, URIs, and targets.
Bot Traffic: Persistent requests, repeatedly asking for
the same services or resources.
Features: Similarity of request strings (Cai & Zou,
2012), entropy of HTTP POST payloads (Al-Bataineh &
White, 2012), byte distribution of HTTP POST payloads
(Al-Bataineh & White, 2012)
The periodic request generated by bots will be similar in
context and aim. Unlike those coming from normal users,
these requests are part of a bot’s recurring tasks. There-
fore, the services, files and URIs identified in requests
should be consistent across both request and bot instances.
Cai & Zou (2012) use Levenshtein Distance (LD) to mea-
sure the similarity of two HTTP request strings in HTTP
flows. Specifically, requests are checked for the similarity
11
D. Acarali et al / 00 (2016) 1–19 12
of their methods (either GET or POST), their file paths
and any additional query parameters. Flows grouped by
destination servers are then clustered by request similar-
ity. Meanwhile, Al-Bataineh & White (2012) measure the
similarity of POST requests by the entropy and byte dis-
tribution of their payloads. They aim to identify similar,
encrypted payloads in outgoing connections which are con-
sidered to be indicative of data exfiltration. This may also
be applicable to instances of HTTPS traffic. Whilst it is
not possible to pick out specific request types, compar-
ing entropy and byte distributions may reveal patterns in
repeated traffic.
Type : Similar HTTP Responses
Normal Traffic: Diverse range of services or files
provided to clients, which may be large in size.
Bot Traffic: Responses made up of small-sized packets
designed to avoid drawing attention.
Features: HTTP response packet payload length (Cai &
Zou, 2012)
Files returned to bots from the C&C servers may vary
in size depending on nature of the commands or updates
they contain. However, botmasters are generally likely
to avoid large bulk transfers which will put strain on the
network and draw unwanted attention. Cai & Zou (2012)
suggest that the payloads received for legitimate requests
tend to be larger in contrast. They measure the length of
HTTP reply packet payloads for a set of clustered flows.
They consider total payloads below a threshold of 2KB to
be suspicious. This feature won’t be useful for HTTPS
traffic, as the payload size will be obscured by encryption.
Type : Poor HTTP Header Integrity
Normal Traffic: Standard HTTP header fields and
values, correctly formatted.
Bot Traffic: Short HTTP headers with missing fields,
or fields filled out with custom strings.
Features: Deviation from header standards (Li et al.,
2014), malicious keywords in initial requests/responses
(Li et al., 2014), incorrect User-Agent fields (Grill &
Rehak, 2014), HTTP header similarity (Cai & Zou, 2012)
Legitimate services generally adhere to protocol stan-
dards, which includes the construction of well-formed
headers. However, malware will sometimes omit non-
mandatory fields or use their own custom strings, resulting
in a divergence from normal protocol implementation. To
capture this attribute, Li et al. (2014) check HTTP headers
for deviations from a predefined profile of normal proto-
col use. They also inspect the headers of the first request
and response packets for a collection of known malware
strings. Similarly, Grill & Rehak (2014) check User-Agent
fields for custom strings which are not actually represen-
tative of the host’s software environment. Meanwhile, Cai
& Zou (2012) compare the similarity of request headers,
where a close match is considered to indicate a bot pres-
ence. However, this information won’t be observable for
HTTPS traffic due to header encryptions.
4.3.4. Application Layer/DNS
Type : Domain-to-IP Mapping
Normal Traffic: Random mapping, or sets of IPs for
known legitimate web services.
Bot Traffic: Similar IPs mapping to suspicious domains.
Features: Similarity of IP mappings (Schiavoni et al.,
2014)
A botmaster who uses multiple C&Cs with fluxing tech-
nology is likely to have ownership over multiple domain
names and IPs. Therefore, it may be reasonable to as-
sume that there are pools of IPs which map to similar
domain names making up sections of the C&C network.
From logs of DNS query results, Schiavoni et al. (2014)
collect a set of domains believed to have been generated
by DGAs, and analyse the similarity of the IPs they map
to. If domains are generated by the same DGA and map
to similar IPs (i.e. in the same subnet), then this is con-
sidered to be indicative of botnet behaviour. If a botnet
implements DNSSEC to avoid hijacking by researchers,
the DNS responses should be digitally signed. This may
provide an extra parameter for comparison, as instances of
similar domain-to-IP mapping may feature DNS responses
containing identical signatures.
Type : Suspicious Domain Names
Normal Traffic: Readable domain names, containing
real words and following formatting rules.
Bot Traffic: Domain names which are made up of
random strings, possibly with similar top (TLD) or
second level domains (SLD).
Features: Deviation from benign names model (Schiavoni
et al., 2014), pronounceability of domain names (Schiavoni
et al., 2014), meaningful character ratio (Schiavoni et al.,
2014), n-gram distribution of domain names (Sharifnya &
Abadi, 2013)
Human-generated domains will typically use titles or fol-
low certain formats. Botnet domains don’t necessarily ad-
here to these characteristics, especially when DGAs are
used. A DGA-generated domain name will be alphanu-
merically random, and in a set, there may be patterns of
similar TLDs or SLDs. Schiavoni et al. (2014) measure the
meaningful character ratio to capture the proportion of a
domain name that passes for real English. They then mea-
sure pronouncability using n-gram normality score (count-
ing the frequency of domain n-grams as they appear in a
dictionary). These results are combined into an average
value for benign domain names. Mahalanobis distance is
then used to compare a domain to the centroid or mean
value of benign domains, with a threshold to determine
when the domain is deemed suspicious. Meanwhile, Shar-
ifnya & Abadi (2013) find the n-gram distribution of ob-
served domains names and compare them to the distribu-
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tions of benign domains to identify those which are algo-
rithmically generated. This is achieved using Kullback-
Leibler (K-L) divergence to measure the distance between
probability distributions and Spearman’s rank coefficient
to measure correlation between n-gram frequency values.
Type : Query Success Rate
Normal Traffic: Normal query traffic, with reasonable
rate of error.
Bot Traffic: Large number of failed DNS queries,
possibly for the same domain names.
Features: Quantity of DNS query failures (Sharifnya
& Abadi, 2013), suspicious query failures across time
(Sharifnya & Abadi, 2013)
A bot trying to rally to its C&C server will generate
DNS queries in bursts as it works sequentially through a
list of hardcoded or DGA-generated domains in order to
find a connectable C&C. The assumption is that in doing
so they will generate failures consistently. Sharifnya &
Abadi (2013) observe failed DNS queries for hosts, defining
a threshold for the number of failures which are considered
suspicious. These events are then mapped across a series
of time periods for that host, where a large number of
suspicious failures over multiple periods results in a higher
negative reputation score.
Table 3 provides a summary of the features, organised
by bot behaviours (as identified in Section 2). Domain
resolution activities revolve around DNS-based features.
The similarity principle, highlighted as Group Activity,
can also be measured. The automation principle is cap-
tured in periodic polling activities, whilst the divergence
principle can be seen in the features under Pull-Down Ac-
tivities (which cover protocol usage that is characteristic
of bots). Additionally, the blank cells of the table serve
as suggestions for areas of future research and possible op-
portunities to find new features.
To provide an alternative view, Figures 2 - 5 collect fea-
tures for each protocol, and break them down by the con-
text, and then by set. For example, TCP features are made
up of Sessions and Time. Under Time, Flags is a set of fea-
tures, listed as the number of different flag types. Mean-
while, IP-based features are split into Flows and Hosts,
which are the two contexts in which measurements are be-
ing made. The former covers features related to end-to-end
communication, whilst the latter is for the characteristics
of those endpoints. HTTP features are broken down into
Requests and Responses (for the characteristics of those
messages), and Headers to account for features relating to
the specific way that bots handle this protocol. Lastly,
DNS features are broken down into Mappings, Domains
and Activity. The Domains set is for features which deal
with the make-up of domain names. Activity covers those
which capture similar, synchronised DNS behaviours, and
finally, Mappings cover the relationships between domains
and IPs.
Figure 6 demonstrates how the features relate to each
other in a simplified example of the traffic flows coming
from a single bot host. Initially, the host is expected to
query domains (where domain A and domain B may be
DGA-generated). Some DNS queries are expected to fail
and if there are multiple bots, group DNS activity may
also be observed. When an IP is resolved, the bot will
then attempt to contact that C&C server, setting up a
TCP session. Some C&C servers may not respond re-
sulting in incomplete handshakes. This may impact the
overall number of TCP packets generated and usage of
flags. Once TCP session are successfully established, bots
will send similar HTTP requests, and likely receive similar
responses.
5. Discussion
So far, we have considered the known behaviours of
HTTP-based botnets, how this impacts the traffic they
generate and how that traffic may be identified. In this
section, we discuss the implications of our findings and
suggest possibilities for the future of HTTP-based botnet
detection.
5.1. Current Research
As we have outlined in this survey there have been many
research efforts in response to the HTTP-based malware
threat. Discussion of these works is split into two parts.
Firstly, we look at the general approaches taken towards
identifying malicious traffic, including the areas in which
research was most focused. Secondly, we consider the ef-
fectiveness of the feature sets used based on the categori-
sations provided in Section 4.
5.1.1. Characterisation & Identification
The survey demonstrates the significance of traffic-based
analysis in not only detecting botnets but also character-
ising and understanding them. Given the nature of bots,
they are highly likely to generate some form of traffic in or-
der to achieve their goals. When that traffic is considered
in terms of underlying activities, it is possible to reveal
patterns of behaviour. We noted that all the approaches
we studied are underpinned by common principles of bot-
net behaviour, defined as automation, similarity (to other
bots), and divergence (from normal users). This shows
that botnet detection is being approached in the same way,
and is hence developing along the same lines.
These basic characteristics are easier to observe when
the type of traffic is narrowed down. Overall, many works
appear to focus on a single stage (of the lifecycle) and a
specific type of traffic. This may be sufficient for detection,
but doesn’t provide detail on the sequence of bot activi-
ties. With no knowledge of the events before the point of
detection, potential vulnerabilities may be missed. Addi-
tionally, bots which slip through detection at that stage
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Table 3. Summary of features sorted by source behaviours against protocol types.
Botnet behaviours
Resolving of C&C Domains Periodic Polling of C&Cs Pull-Down of Commands &
Updates
Group Activity Data Exfiltration
Similarity of IP mappings be-
tween domains, used for cluster-
ing (Schiavoni et al., 2014)
- - Suspicious collective queries to
DGA-generated domains (Shar-
ifnya & Abadi, 2013)
-
Deviation of domains from
model, measured with Ma-
halanobis distance (Schiavoni
et al., 2014)
- - Participant similarity of hosts
across time, measured with
Jaccard distance (Sharifnya &
Abadi, 2013)
-
Meaningful characters ratio of
domain prefix split into sub-
strings of 3 symbols (Schiavoni
et al., 2014)
- - - -
N-gram distribution of domain
names (Sharifnya & Abadi,
2013)
- - - -
No. of DNS query failures per
host which exceeds a threshold
(Sharifnya & Abadi, 2013)
- - - -
DNS
Suspicious query failures gener-
ated across time (Sharifnya &
Abadi, 2013)
- - - -
- Packet count entropy for flow
set, where value closer to 0 de-
notes bots (Soniya & Wilscy,
2013)
- Source IPs concentrated in sim-
ilar /24 subnets (Cai & Zou,
2012)
-
- Periodic request flows for simi-
lar flows, mined per time win-
dow (Li et al., 2014)
- Unique DDoS participants,
measured by no. of packets
generated compared to an
estimator (Shiaeles et al., 2012)
-
- Inter-packet delays between
consecutive packets for infer-
ring Hidden Markov model (Lu
& Brooks, 2011)
- Proportion of bandwidth con-
sumed by flows with the same
destination IP, indicating possi-
ble DDoS attack (Xiang et al.,
2009)
-
IP
- Entropy of time gap between
similar flows, with upper bot
threshold of 0.5 (Soniya &
Wilscy, 2013)
- - -
- Generalised entropy of IP
packet sizes/source IP address
distribution, compared to
thresholds (Xiang et al., 2011)
- - -
- Information distance of IP
packet sizes/source IP ad-
dress distribution compared to
thresholds (Xiang et al., 2011)
- - -
- No of request bytes, used for
clustering (Wang et al., 2010)
Ratio of incoming to outgoing
TCP packets, sampled in 5s in-
tervals (Venkatesh & Nadara-
jan, 2012)
- -
- No of response bytes, used for
clustering (Wang et al., 2010)
Ratio of TCP packets to overall
packets, sampled in 5s intervals
(Venkatesh & Nadarajan, 2012)
- -
- No of useful packets, used for
clustering (Wang et al., 2010)
Ratio of one-way TCP connec-
tions, sampled in 5s intervals
(Venkatesh & Nadarajan, 2012)
- -
TCP
- Periodicity of similar TCP
connections, where connections
form a periodic point sequence
(Wang et al., 2010)
No of SYN, PSH & FIN
flags, sampled in 5s intervals
(Venkatesh & Nadarajan, 2012)
- -
- TCP packet arrival time, in 1-2s
intervals, compared to a mean
estimator (Shiaeles et al., 2012)
- - -
- Degree of periodic repeatability
of requests, where low value de-
notes bots (Etemad & Vahdani,
2012)
Similarity of request strings,
measured with Levenshtein dis-
tance & threshold between 0-0.3
(Cai & Zou, 2012)
- Byte entropy of POST pay-
loads; encrypted content
denoted by Shannon entropy
value greater than 6.503545
(Al-Bataineh & White, 2012)
- Periodic factor, a binary value
of whether an event was de-
tected across periods or not (Es-
lahi et al., 2015)
Deviation from header stan-
dards, missing fields like User-
Agent or Referrer (Li et al.,
2014)
- Byte frequency distribution of
POST payloads, finds those
which are most constant (Al-
Bataineh & White, 2012)
- Range of absolute frequencies of
HTTP messages, where value
greater than 1 denotes non-
uniform requests (Eslahi et al.,
2015)
Keywords in initial requests/ re-
sponses, like “os=” or “id=” (Li
et al., 2014)
- Response packet payload
length, with total bot context
length threshold of 2KB (Cai &
Zou, 2012)
HTTP
- Messages time sequence, checks
if intervals of requests follow
an arithmetic sequence (Eslahi
et al., 2015)
Incorrect User-Agent fields, de-
fined as unknown, well-known,
or empty (Grill & Rehak, 2014)
- -
- Request density, defined as no.
of requests between given end-
points, with bot threshold be-
tween 0.004-0.1 (Cai & Zou,
2012)
- - -
- Request periodicity for 1hr in-
tervals, finds hosts with activ-
ities in each interval (Eslahi
et al., 2013)
- - -
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Figure 2. IP-based features, from (Soniya & Wilscy, 2013), (Li et al.,
2014), (Lu & Brooks, 2011), (Cai & Zou, 2012), (Shiaeles et al., 2012),
(Xiang et al., 2011) & (Xiang et al., 2009).
Figure 3. TCP-based features, from (Wang et al., 2010), (Shiaeles et al.,
2012), & (Venkatesh & Nadarajan, 2012).
Figure 4. HTTP-based features, from (Etemad & Vahdani, 2012), (Es-
lahi et al., 2013), (Eslahi et al., 2015), (Cai & Zou, 2012), (Al-Bataineh
& White, 2012), (Li et al., 2014), & (Grill & Rehak, 2014).
Figure 5. DNS-based features, from (Schiavoni et al., 2014) & (Shar-
ifnya & Abadi, 2013).
cannot be identified at the next stage. Therefore, it is im-
portant to be able to detect various types of botnet traffic
in order to uncover the methods of the botmaster. Under-
standing of chains of events may also be significant when
HTTP-based network activity is too close to benign traffic.
In our survey, we found that a large number of works tar-
geted control traffic. This is a logical approach, since this
communication is central to the functioning of the botnet.
However, in doing so, these methods can only detect C&C
traffic as it manifests. In other words, bots can only be
detected after they are within the observed network. For
the works who rely on the similarity principle, there needs
to be multiple bot instances in order to make a reliable de-
tection. Even approaches that propose host-based traffic
analysis will need the same bot to engage in activities mul-
tiple times. Therefore, bots should ideally be detected in
the minimum time in order to mitigate potential damage
caused. A promising angle is the observation of DNS traf-
15
D. Acarali et al / 00 (2016) 1–19 16
Figure 6. Overview of the features in the context of network traffic.
fic in the rally stage. Since a bot needs to resolve domains,
this provides a window of opportunity to make detections
before bots are able to establish connections to their C&C
servers. Where fluxing is used, even after connections are
made bots will eventually need to send out another round
of queries.
We also learnt that (similarly to propagation traffic),
attack traffic is difficult to characterise, due to the variety
of attack methods which may be utilised by botmasters.
This contrasts highly with control traffic, as campaigns
may start and end at any time and exfiltrated data may be
of variable length. It is therefore more challenging to pick
out instances of uniform behaviour. A potential solution to
this may be to detect the command messages specifically
containing attack instructions to try and pre-empt these
activities.
5.1.2. Features
In Section 4 we chose to organise features by protocol for
a number of reasons. Our first aim was to attempt a high-
level characterisation of botnet traffic based on the imple-
mentation of those protocols. Whilst works like Li et al.
(2014) and Soniya & Wilscy (2013) make use of benign
and malicious traffic profiles, we suggest that for the bene-
fit of the community, considering how different researchers
have captured similar bot traffic and combining these per-
spectives provides a better overview of bot behaviour for a
given protocol. For example, we learnt that HTTP headers
may use similar keywords (Li et al., 2014), use wrong field
entries (Grill & Rehak, 2014), omit fields altogether and
show similarity across instances (Cai & Zou, 2012). The
results of this characterisation are summarised in Figures
2 - 5.
Secondly, we were also able to gain an understanding
of how the same traffic may look at different layers. This
may be of particular benefit when considering whether to
use flow-based or packet-based analysis, or working with
restricted datasets. For example, for polling activities, we
have seen that periodicity can be measured at the net-
work, transport and application layers. This shows that
researchers and defenders have a number of options which
can be adapted to their specific circumstances.
Similarly, different characteristics can be observed at
each layer at the same time. An example of this based
on the surveyed papers is when researchers see a number
of flows with the same source and destination IPs, with
similar timings and lengths, and deem them suspicious.
This may then be supported by the observation of multi-
ple TCP sessions continuously being set up and torn down
within those flows, increasing the level of suspiciousness.
This in turn may be supported by the presence of repeated
HTTP requests with the same anomalies in their headers.
Hence, despite only representing a single time period, each
layer provides additional detail which increases the likeli-
hood of the source host being a bot.
If we take a number of those instantaneous snapshots of
the traffic over time, this theoretically starts to reveal the
sequence of bot activities. As demonstrated in Figure 6,
we have features that are designed to capture the progress
of a bot from its rally stage through to attacks, suggesting
both a number of expected anomalies, as well as the order
in which they should appear. In this paper, we consider all
of the surveyed works to be observing (at a high-level) the
same series of events, focusing on different moments in the
botnet lifecycle and different layers of the protocol stack.
Hence, providing a consolidated view of those approaches
can help to define the expected sequence of bot behaviours.
For HTTPS-based botnet communications, this be-
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comes more difficult as application layer details are hid-
den behind SSL or TLS encryption. If it is not possible
to decrypt captured packets, then network analysts may
need to focus their attention on statistically identifying
anomalies at the lower layers. For example, Venkatesh &
Nadarajan (2012), who use transport layer features, were
able to detect encrypted bot traffic. The presence of web
activity (inferred from the use of SSL or TLS) may also
still be used as a marker for the bot’s current status in its
lifecycle.
We also briefly touched upon the possible use of
DNSSEC in Section 4.3.4. As mentioned, a botmaster
may choose to implement DNSSEC to avoid instances of
bot hijacking by confirming to bots that they are indeed
connecting to a real C&C server. However, DNSSEC does
not encrypt responses (ICANN, 2016), so under these cir-
cumstances application layer analysis is still available, un-
like with HTTPS. Furthermore, a botnet using DNSSEC
may attract attention due to larger packet sizes (Hands
et al., 2015).
5.2. Challenges & Future Work
Current detection approaches focus on traffic generated
at one stage of the botnet lifecycle. We feel it is beneficial
to be able to detect bots across the stages, as this provides
both a wider view of bot activities (which can aid predic-
tive approaches) and a wider window of opportunity for
detection. Furthermore, positive detection made in one
phase can potentially be supported or confirmed in the
next, improving accuracy.
False positives also remain a problem. This appears to
be inevitable to some extent as services operating on the
same protocols through the same infrastructure are go-
ing to share some characteristics. Hence, attempting to
differentiate traffic based on only one or two of those char-
acteristics is likely to fail at some point. The most obvious
solution is to consider a wider range of features, from dif-
ferent protocols. We predict that the best results can be
achieved if the chosen features combine measurements of
automation, similarity and divergence.
For both multi-phase detection and mitigation of false
positives, a tradeoff exists between the amount of data
analysed and the level of processing required, so it is im-
practical to attempt to accommodate all of the features
mentioned. Therefore, in the future we would like to inves-
tigate combinations of features (across layers and stages)
to identify those which best complement each other.
Another challenge is the general lack of uniform met-
rics within the research community. This makes measure-
ments of traffic attributes or anomalies difficult to compare
across different works. Any common definitions will need
to clearly encompass or enumerate given characteristics,
whilst being flexible enough to be used in multiple con-
texts. One potential approach may be a specially-designed
language like CybOX (GitHub, 2016).
In the future, we would like to expand this work by
identifying more features. We believe that incorporating
other methods for measuring anomalies will provide more
breadth and hence improve our understanding of bot pro-
cesses. This can also help to uncover new characteris-
tics which are currently being overlooked. Other protocols
which are used by HTTP-based botnets should be included
as well. For example, UDP may provide new insights into
bot DNS traffic, whilst SMTP could help to characterise
attacks related to spam mail.
There is also potential benefit in considering the level
of processing needed to acquire different features. In this
paper, we tried to consolidate similar features into sets,
denoted by the characteristics being measured. However,
features can be sorted as primary and secondary, where the
former are ‘raw’ and taken directly from the data, whilst
the latter are derived from those raw features. An ex-
ample may be timestamps and time intervals. This will
provide an opportunity to understand dependency rela-
tionships and may help uncover more efficient handling
methods.
5.3. Impact of Next-Generation Protocols
As technology progresses, newer versions of existing pro-
tocols are being introduced. Differences in the formatting
and implementation of those protocols may have an impact
on the operations of malware, and how related features are
measured. An example is IPv6, which will be more widely
adopted as Internet coverage continues to grow. The ob-
vious difference between IPv6 and IPv4 is the increased
address range (Odom, 2011b). This will remove the need
for private IPs and functions like NAT (Odom, 2011b).
Instead of bots or C&Cs who share similar subnets, we
may see a much wider distribution. IPv6 headers are also
longer (due to longer IP addresses (Odom, 2011b)) which
may impact processing times of current detection methods
which rely on addresses to separate flows.
Another new protocol version is HTTP/2, which is
designed to provide general performance improvements
(O’Reilly.com, 2013) (GitHub). This new standard com-
presses HTTP headers (from ASCII to binary) and al-
lows multiple HTTP requests and responses to take place
within the same TCP connection (comparable to an ad-
vanced version of current HTTP pipelining) (O’Reilly.com,
2013) (GitHub). HTTP/2 also features server push,
whereby the server doesn’t have to wait for the browser
to parse HTML pages before pushing related embedded
assets (O’Reilly.com, 2013) (GitHub). These changes may
have an impact on expected TCP statistics. For instance,
if bots try to hide themselves by making multiple, small
connections, they may stand out more against larger,
longer TCP connections. On the other hand, malware
could exploit the server push feature to infect user sys-
tems without needing user interaction with webpage ele-
ments. Meanwhile, compressed binary HTTP headers will
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potentially make automated analysis of application layer
information much simpler for researchers, by removing the
need to parse plain text messages.
6. Conclusion
HTTP-based botnets aim to carry out their activities by
hiding in plain sight, amongst the vast quantities of web
traffic generated by benign user activities. To assist in the
fight against this threat, we have provided a study of the
general tasks that bots must complete at different stages
of their lifecycle, along with the traffic events which may
be observed as a result. We have surveyed a collection
of recent papers focused on HTTP-based communication
detection, and categorised and evaluated the traffic-based
features they have used. We have presented our findings
with a hierarchical structure based on feature types and
protocols arranged by OSI layers, and touched upon how
secure versions and future iterations of these protocols may
impact analysis capability.
Based on the wealth of traffic-based detection techniques
presented, it is clear that this is a promising and effective
approach in defending against botnets. We have seen that
with a clear understanding of correct implementation of
network protocols and processes, it is possible to pick out
instances of unusual behaviour. However, it is important
to be able to observe across multiple layers of the net-
work wherever possible, and to tie sequences of activities
together to put specific instances of bot traffic into con-
text. Network analysts should therefore carefully consider
the types of devices, users and services which they would
expect to see on their networks, as well as what types of
capture or log data will be available to them.
We briefly discussed how analysis techniques may need
to be adapted for new protocol versions like HTTP/v2 and
IPv6. As trends in the digital landscape shift and develop,
so too will the approaches of malware. An example of a
recent trend among users has been identity anonymisa-
tion with the use of tools like the Tor network (Project)
to maintain privacy on the web. A botnet which runs
on the Tor network would be difficult to track without
gaining control of multiple relays points (Project), making
it difficult to trace end-to-end communication. Similarly,
as HTTPS and encryption becomes more widely imple-
mented, this can diminish the depth of the analyses that
can be made. However, works like Venkatesh & Nadara-
jan (2012) show that it is possible to overcome these
obstacles and detect patterns in traffic. Future botnet-
detection (and intrusion-detection approaches in general)
should consider and work around these limitations.
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